The ties that bind : the political involvement of Flemish party staffers

Political staffers are an overlooked but increasingly relevant area of study. Not only are political parties increasingly dependent on their staff due to professionalization and decreasing activism among party members, many elected officials learn the ropes in these paid positions behind the scenes. As they became key players in the decision-making process of contemporary representative democracies, scholars have argued that the political involvement of staffers as party activists has decreased as a result of professionalization (Panebianco, 1988). Based on survey data collected among staffers (N=623), this paper examines if this assumption applies to the Flemish case by analyzing four indicators for party activism: current party membership, party membership prior to being hired, holding an internal party position and electoral candidacy. Furthermore, differences between subgroups of staffers are contrasted to understand which types of staff are more likely to have a political connection to their party. The results demonstrate that the party ties of political staff in Flanders, like other European cases, are considerably stronger than assumed by influential party models (Katz & Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988). Moreover, the analysis indicates that political involvement is the highest among staffers with political-strategic tasks and personnel at parliamentary party group groups. In conclusion, the impact of individual party-related factors such as ideological position, electoral strength and party age should be studied among a higher number of parties to determine which specific aspects of party culture might stimulate political involvement among staffers

Knowledge is power : the staffing advantage of the ‘Party in Public Office'

This paper analyzes the distribution of staff resources between party faces. While earlier studies have compared central – and parliamentary offices, this study also includes ministerial offices. To fully capture the differences in staffing, I examine both the quantity (staff size) and quality (education, experience, tasks) of their staffs. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional analysis of original survey data collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands (N=1009). While the Belgian cabinet system includes extensive ministerial offices, ministerial staff is limited in the Dutch non-cabinet system. The results show how this institutional difference shapes the internal distribution of resources. While the party in parliament does not have a clear staffing advantage over the party in central office in Belgium, they are both eclipsed by the large, highly qualified party in government. In the Netherlands, the impact of ministerial offices is negligible and the staff of the party in parliament is both larger and more qualified than the staff of the party in central office

Between grassroots and elites? Assessing congruence between staffers and party members

This paper examines whether political professionalization causes ideological incongruence between party strata. For the first time ever, this unique study analyzes the internal opinion structure of 5 Flemish political parties by comparing the ideological preferences of staffers and party members. Breaking new theoretical ground, the paper builds on May's law of curvilinear disparity, literature on political professionalization and cleavage theory to predict and interpret (in)congruences between staffers and party members. The analysis is based on the combination of original survey data collected among the staff of 5 Flemish Belgian parties (N=560) with survey data collected among their party members by the MAPP project (N=10.022). Congruence between both groups is measured in-depth, covering 7 salient political issues including socioeconomic issues, socio-cultural policies and globalization. The results demonstrate that staffers are mostly congruent with party members, with a few remarkable exceptions. As anticipated by my reinterpretation of cleavage theory, incongruences are more prevalent among mainstream parties and mostly appear on issues concerning globalization. This cosmopolitan bias among staffers is primarily driven by an educational-and generational divide with party members. In the future, these educational and generational contrasts within parties could fuel genuine disagreements between party strata, especially in mainstream parties with old, shrinking membership bases

Knowledge is power : the staffing advantage of the ‘Party in Public Office'

This paper analyzes the distribution of staff resources between party faces. While earlier studies have compared central – and parliamentary offices, this study also includes ministerial offices. To fully capture the differences in staffing, I examine both the quantity (staff size) and quality (education, experience, tasks) of their staffs. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional analysis of original survey data collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands (N=1009). While the Belgian cabinet system includes extensive ministerial offices, ministerial staff is limited in the Dutch non-cabinet system. The results show how this institutional difference shapes the internal distribution of resources. While the party in parliament does not have a clear staffing advantage over the party in central office in Belgium, they are both eclipsed by the large, highly qualified party in government. In the Netherlands, the impact of ministerial offices is negligible and the staff of the party in parliament is both larger and more qualified than the staff of the party in central office